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     This thesis examines the equity of punishment awarded 
by the Naval Academy’s Administrative Conduct System 
utilizing 7,704 conduct cases from the graduating classes 
of 1998 to 2001.  Based on equity theory, the consistency 
of punishment is analyzed in terms of demerits awarded to 
athletes, minorities, women, and different midshipmen 
classes.  A multiple linear regression model is used to 
identify statistically significant subgroups, while 
controlling for level of offense and whether or not a 
secondary offense was included with the primary offense.  
Statistically significant subgroups in order of precedence 
are all classes, women, and minorities.  Furthermore, the 
regression results are compared to survey questions 
regarding midshipmen’s perceptions of the Conduct System to 
determine if congruency exists between the perceptions and 
the statistics.  Results of this study are used to create 
awareness to disparities in the awarding of punishment and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is when equals have or are assigned unequal 
shares, or people who are not equal, equal shares 




In 1990 a board, chaired by Admiral J. M. Boorda, 
investigated the Honor and Conduct systems of the Naval 
Academy.  Among its noteworthy findings, the board cited 
existing Academy surveys indicating that midshipmen 
perceived that women, ethnic minorities, varsity athletes, 
and different classes received disparate treatment and 
inconsistent punishment under the Naval Academy’s 
Administrative Conduct System (Conduct System or ACS).   
Although the board’s research did not support this in 
their own investigation, members believed that even the 
smallest perception of inequity on this issue could 
seriously degrade the equal opportunity climate within the 
Brigade (Boorda, 1990, P.21).  This misperception was 
exacerbated by the fact that there was no formal 
dissemination of the Conduct System adjudication results to 
the Brigade to dispel misconceptions.  In order to confront 
the reality behind midshipmen perspectives, the board 
recommended formalizing a requirement to analyze the 
results of actions taken under the Conduct System for 
possible disparate treatment and suggested that results be 
widely disseminated to the Brigade (Boorda, 1990, p. 22). 
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     Eleven years later the Naval Academy’s Values Survey 
still echoes the perceptions of those midshipmen Admiral 
Boorda encountered.  Additionally, headlines in prominent 
local newspapers read, “Plebe retention high, but survey 
finds discontent with punishment systems”(Sullivan, 2000).  
Are the perceptions of the midshipmen about the ACS 
misperceptions, or are they symptomatic of a flawed system?  
Though this thesis is motivated by the perceptions of the 
midshipmen toward the Conduct System, it primarily seeks to 
statistically address conduct offense cases in terms of the 
consistency of punishments awarded.   
B. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis does not critique the Conduct System in 
whole.  The purpose of this study is narrower; it serves to 
analyze whether there is statistical evidence of 
inconsistent punishments administered under the Naval 
Academy Administrative Conduct System, and whether 
midshipmen perceptions of administration of the system are 
in line with statistical evidence.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research paper statistically examines case data 
to determine whether they support the null hypotheses that 
there is no inconsistency of punishment across time or 
among subgroups.  The specific questions addressed are: 
1. Are the punishments administered through the Naval 
Academy’s Conduct System consistently related to 
the intensity of the charged offense (a) across 
time and (b) independent of athletic status, 
minority status, gender, and class? 
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2. Are midshipmen perceptions of the Conduct System 
congruent with the statistical analysis? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, ASSUMPTIONS 
     The construct of consistency is central and critical 
for this study.  Consistency is here defined in terms of 
equity theory.  Equity theory states that consistency with 
regard to punishment does not always imply that the same 
offense will receive the same punishment every time, but 
rather that the punishment is in line with expectations.  
If the punishment deviates from expectations, either by 
seeming excessive (harsh) or insufficient (lenient), a 
perception of inequity is likely to occur.  Therefore, 
consistency is fundamental to the perception of fairness. 
     This study cannot examine data relating to all 
possible reasons that may contribute to midshipmen 
perceptions of the Conduct System.  However, this study 
does speak toward the perceptions formed by midshipmen who 
may observe how many demerits are awarded relative to the 
sub-groups identified in the first research question 
(athletes, minorities, females, and all four classes). 
This thesis statistically analyzes the case data for 
evidence of inconsistency.  Additionally, the statistical 
results will be related to midshipmen surveyed perceptions 
of the Conduct System. 
Data are drawn for Naval Academy midshipmen from the 
classes of 1998 through 2001.  To date, this represents all 
the classes that have completed all four years coupled with 
conduct case data that have been archived in the USNA 
Midshipmen Information System (MIDS).  This database is 
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unique in that it spans a time period in which the Conduct 
System underwent a transformation.  Prior to 1998 offenses 
were categorized by a level series (1000 to 6000) system, 
which went from least to most serious.  After 1998 offense 
levels were simplified to either Minor or Major. 
The 1998 transformation of the Conduct System, 
presented in Chapter IV, is the only contextual factor 
considered in this study.  Other contextual factors, for 
instance, the turnover of leadership within the faculty and 
Brigade may or may not lead to philosophical differences in 
how conduct is enforced and punishment is awarded.  Some 
discussion of contextual factors is offered in the 
Discussion section after the results are presented. 
A primary limitation of this thesis is the exclusive 
use of demerits as the measure of punishment by the Conduct 
System.  Demerits were chosen because they are the sole 
punishment measure used in calculating a midshipman’s 
Conduct Grade.  Furthermore, using a single measure of 
punishment avoided issues of weighting and other 
statistical and data problems.  Additional forms of 
punishment include Restriction, Tours, Extra Duty, Loss of 
Privileges, Loss of Leave, and Conduct Probation.   
The focus on demerits is a limitation because these 
additional punishments are used together, often in addition 
to demerits.  Therefore, it is sensible to assume that they 
too affect the perceptions of punishment administered by 
the Conduct System.  How much each form of punishment 
weighs into midshipmen perceptions is not examined by this 
study and is an obvious direction for further research.  
However, it seems likely that consistency in the 
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administration of demerits would support an assumption and 
perception of consistency across other forms of punishment.  
Conversely, if this thesis indicates inconsistencies in the 
awarding of demerits, it serves as a warning in that the 
other forms of punishment will also be suspected of the 
same. 
Secondary limitations include the fact that there is 
no analysis of what midshipmen consider “lenient” or 
“harsh” relative to the definition of consistency used in 
this study.  Additionally, there is not a variable for 
repeat offenders.  Repeat offenders, although present in 
the data, are not included as a specific variable in the 
statistical model.  Both limitations are discussed in the 
interpretation of results.   
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
 This study is divided into five chapters.  Chapter II 
begins with a brief overview of the ACS then concludes by 
discussing applicable theories and related studies of the 
primary variables of the research question.  Chapter III 
presents the data sets and methodology used for the 
statistical analysis.  Chapter IV reviews the findings of 
the data analysis.  Finally, Chapter V provides a research 
discussion, conclusions, recommendations, and it makes 
suggestions for further research. 












THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  7 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter contains five primary parts.  The first 
provides a basic overview of the Administrative Conduct 
System (ACS).  The second discusses the theoretical 
concepts of consistency and how they relate to the Conduct 
System, punishment and rewards, and the organization.  The 
third discusses the relationship between athletes and 
academia, and the fourth defines the class structure at the 
Academy.  The fifth section discusses the theoretical 
concepts of the organizational treatment of women and 
minorities in organizational disciplinary systems, and 
organizational culture.  The final section summarizes the 
chapter. 
B. THE NAVAL ACADEMY ADMINISTRATIVE CONDUCT SYSTEM  
The primary instruction that promulgates the Naval 
Academy's regulations on conduct is the Administrative 
Conduct Manual, Commandant of Midshipmen Instruction 
1610.2B.  This instruction states that the nature of the:   
Administrative Conduct System is to provide 
disciplinary measures more serious than the non-
punitive administrative corrective measures 
(oral/written counseling or reprimands, etc.), but 
less serious than trial by court martial. (Commandant 
of Midshipmen, 2000, p. 1) 
 
  8 
This is a midshipmen oriented disciplinary system, 
which has some similarity to the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, and is in place to develop leadership skills of 
midshipmen, while concurrently maintaining good order and 
discipline at the Academy.   
1. ACS Design and Execution 
When it is reported that an offense against the ACS is 
suspected, the administrative process involves two possible 
steps.  The first step is an inquiry into the alleged 
misconduct, which, after an investigation, may include a 
hearing conducted by an Adjudicating Authority.  This 
Adjudicating Authority determines whether and to what 
extent a midshipman should be punished (Commandant of 
Midshipmen, 2000, p. 1).  Adjudicating Authorities, who are 
designated by the Commandant of Midshipmen, exercise 
personal discretion in evaluating each case.  During the 
investigation and deliberations they are to consider the 
nature of the offense, the record of the midshipman, the 
need for good order and discipline, and the effect of the 
Conduct System on the midshipman.  The effect on the 
midshipman can vary from rehabilitation to consequences 
affecting his or her overall conduct standing.  
Additionally, if the cases of two or more midshipmen 
involved in the same incident are heard by different 
Adjudicating Authorities, the Adjudicating Authorities 
should attempt to maintain the level of consistency of 
punishment that is also in keeping with good order and 
discipline among members of the Brigade (Commandant of 
Midshipmen, 2000, p. 2-11). 
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The second step occurs in those cases in which the 
Adjudicating Authority has determined that a major offense 
has occurred and recommends that the Commandant of 
Midshipmen review the case (Commandant of Midshipmen, 2000, 
p. 1).  The Commandant has a broad range of options that 
extend from dismissal of the case to recommending discharge 
from the Academy.  The latter requires the approval of the 
Superintendent and ultimately the Secretary of the Navy. 
Officers, noncommissioned officers, midshipmen, and 
civilians may report midshipmen whom they suspect committed 
any offense covered in the ACS manual (Commandant of 
Midshipmen, 2000, p. 2-3).  When a midshipman is accused of 
committing an offense, it is first assigned a numeric 
delinquency code, which defines a specific conduct offense.  
Descriptions of offenses and the maximum punishment that 
may be awarded for such are delineated in the ACS manual.  
For example, a midshipmen who is misbehaving while in a 
formation may be charged under section 09, “Standards and 
Behaviors” subsection 16:  “Improper conduct in ranks.”  
This conduct offense would be written up as 0916.  
Additionally, the offense would be categorized by the 
seriousness of the offense, ranging from the least 
consequential (Minor Offense) to the most serious (Major 
Offense).  The example provided would be considered a Minor 
Offense per the ACS manual with a maximum punishment of 5-
10 demerits. 
While charging an offense the following applies:  
If more than one offense has allegedly been   
committed by the same midshipman, where such as   
to form one course of misconduct, such offenses   
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will normally be considered as one event, from  
which one punishment will be awarded.  The most  
serious charge will be used as the primary  
offense; all others will be listed as secondary.   
Punishments awarded for multiple offense cases  
may not exceed the maximum allowed for the  
primary offense. (Commandant of Midshipmen, 2000,  
p.2-3) 
The conduct case then enters one of the two steps of 
inquiry previously discussed.  Overall, cases are handled 
at the lowest level deemed appropriate by both the 
midshipmen and staff chain of commands via the Commandant’s 
delegations.  Minor Offenses are to be used as tools for 
the Company Officers to train midshipmen, primarily First 
Class, in conduct standards and procedures they will 
encounter in a career of military service (Commandant of 
Midshipmen, 2000, p. 1-2).  If upon the completion of the 
adjudication process a punishment is deemed necessary, 
specific allowable punishments for each offense are also 
delineated in the ACS manual, chapter 2.  
2. Conduct Standing 
In addition to a conduct case having a possible 
punishment attached, a farther-reaching consequence is its 
effect on the midshipman’s overall conduct standing.  The 
conduct standing is based solely on Demerits.  A grade is 
assigned, which accounts for the accumulation of all 
conduct adjudications during a specific semester.  Demerits 
are numerical points awarded (punishment) by an 
Adjudicating Authority when the midshipman was found to 
have committed the offense.   
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This conduct standing and grade, which has a semester, 
annual, and career cumulative measure, has two primary 
consequences.  The first is that it is weighted in the 
individual midshipman’s class standing, which is Order of 
Merit. Order of Merit is significant in determining 
midshipman’s service assignment options upon graduation.  
The second is that the cumulative effect can lead to an 
unsatisfactory conduct status.  For example, although a 
minor offense by itself may not have serious consequences, 
the summation of demerits accumulated by multiple 
independent incidents may have major consequences, which 
ultimately could include discharge from the Academy. 
C. CONSISTENCY IN THE CONDUCT SYSTEM, PUNISHMENT AND 
REWARDS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE. 
In Admiral Boorda’s 1990 review of the Conduct System, 
he cited lack of feedback and dissemination of information 
on the disposition of conduct cases as one cause for 
cynical attitudes and perceptions of the Conduct System.  
Boorda stated:  
     When midshipmen are charged with a serious  
conduct offense, members of the Brigade follow  
     the processing of the offense very closely, using  
results that are tough but fair as validation of  
their own conduct as well as that of the Conduct  
System.  Conversely, when they perceive that  
another midshipmen has unjustly escaped  
punishment or has been punished unfairly, they  
question the entire Conduct System as well as  
their own values. (Boorda, 1990, p. 20) 
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According to surveys conducted with Boorda’s study and even 
more recently, this notion is compounded if the case in 
question involves one or any combination of the following 
midshipmen demographics: female, minority (non-Caucasian), 
athlete, and graduating class.  
Consistency with regard to punishment does not always 
imply that the same offense will receive the same 
punishment every time, but if the punishment deviates from 
expectations, either by seeming excessive (harsh) or 
insufficient (lenient), a perception of inequity may occur.  
Therefore consistency of punishment is fundamental to a 
rational system and to the perception of fairness.  A 
review of numerous theories of consistency (Kerr, 1979; 
Kerr, 1997; Kerr, 1995; Folger, Sheppard, & Buttram; and 
Young, 1994) in relation to organizational cultures and 
perceptions reveals that equity is the common thread. In 
the context of a justice system, like the Academy’s 
Administrative Conduct System, equity has almost an 
entirely subjective element based on an interpretation of 
experienced reality. 
Equity is interpreted in terms of cultural and intra-
organizational norms and values (Kerr, 1997, p. viii).  The 
preponderance of the facts and circumstances that surround 
conduct cases at the Naval Academy vary, but an equitable 
outcome is most likely to be perceived only if it conforms 
to those norms and values.  For example, it may be 
perceived as equitable, or fair, for a Plebe and 1/C 
midshipman to receive a different measure of punishment for 
the same offense.  Steven Kerr (1997) reiterates this idea 
in his conclusions about equity, which states, “We shall 
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consider equity to mean that a person’s rewards are at 
least related to his or her performance" (p. vii).  If the 
expectation of a 4/C Plebe's performance is low due to his 
or her inexperience, the punishment may be minimal.  In 
contrast, the 1/C midshipman is expected to perform at a 
higher level and therefore is punished more severely 
because he or she should have known better than to commit 
such an offense in the first place.  Of course, depending 
on the true norms and values at the Naval Academy the 
reverse or totally different scenario is also possible. 
In a system of discipline and justice, information 
sharing is crucial and can be equated to visibility.  In 
the absence of information, people share inaccurate data 
that reveal inequities that really don’t exist (Kerr, 1997, 
p. xiii).  The phrase, “One's perception is one’s reality,” 
rings true when applied to several thousand midshipmen and 
their ability to spread information.  Admiral Boorda (1990) 
referred to this phenomenon as the “Rumor Mill.” Steven 
Kerr (1997) says equitable and efficient rewards must, at a 
minimum, be visible to those who receive them, and to those 
affected by the consequences.  Applied to the Academy’s 
Conduct System, the "reward" Kerr speaks of is punishment 
for an offense, which must be visible to the offender and 
the entire Brigade. 
Efficiency, as related to the Conduct System, is 
conceptualized not in terms of past performance, but in 
terms of future performance: how it pays forward.  If the 
primary goal of the Academy’s Conduct System is to instill 
in midshipmen the self-discipline necessary to meet the 
challenges they will encounter in a career of military 
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service, then efficiency should be defined by the Conduct 
System’s ability to deter future aberrant behavior.  There 
are specific indicators that are contrary to this concept.  
To highlight just one example, there are midshipmen who 
wear black N’s on their letter sweaters like a badge of 
honor, a sort of counter-culture.  These midshipmen are 
openly held in esteem by the Brigade, folk heroes, not for 
their prowess on athletic fields or in the classrooms, but 
for surviving the most punishments dealt out by the Conduct 
System, often barely evading being discharged.  According 
to Kerr (1975), this behavior is indicative of a system, or 
culture, that is dysfunctional in that behaviors that are 
rewarded are those the rewarder is trying to discourage; 
conversely, the behavior he desires is not being rewarded 
at all. 
The culture of an organization, particularly a 
military one, is an amalgam of values, customs, traditions, 
and philosophical underpinnings that, over time, has 
created a shared institutional ethos (Ulmer, Collins, & 
Jacobs, 2000, p. XVIII).  Closely linked to military 
culture, and much easier to assess directly, is 
organizational climate, which is essentially how members of 
an organization feel about the organization.  The 
perceptions about the system of rewards and punishments, 
along with other important factors, influence an 
organization’s climate.  Climate ultimately determines how 
individuals feel about the quality of the institution as a 
whole (Ulmer, Collins, & Jacobs, 2000, p. XVIII).  It may 
be this fact that explains the cynical attitude of some 
midshipmen toward the ACS.   
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D. ATHLETICS VS. ACADEMIA 
When equity is framed in the context of a justice 
system, the notion of equality is commonly included with 
it.  In Folger, Sheppard, and Buttram’s (1995) essay, 
“Equity, Equality, and Need; Three Faces of Social 
Justice,” they state that relative equality of distribution 
validates people’s feelings of full-fledged membership in a 
cohesive unit, whereas inequality can fractionate the 
organization.  In this study, the cohesive unit is the 
entire Brigade of midshipmen.  In the context of the 
Conduct System, “equality of distribution” implies equality 
of punishment across the entire Brigade within the cultural 
norms and values.  To go a step further, if there is a 
perception of inequality (i.e., inconsistency of punishment 
in the context of cultural norms and values) with respect 
to how subgroups are treated, then attributions of 
privilege or prejudice may be attributed as reasons to 
perceived disparities in treatments.  In essence, this is 
what is meant by, “fractionate the organization,” and 
athletes are just one sub-group on which to focus during 
this study.   
The relationship between athletes and academia has 
become a utilitarian one for many universities, both public 
and private.  Bailey and Littleton (1991) state that even 
the few institutions whose academic emphases either predate 
the dramatic evolution of college sports, as does the Naval 
Academy’s, or in some other way have avoided an overt 
relationship, feel the pressure of those forces that can 
lead to an academic-athletic imbalance and thus to abuses.  
There is, of course, a range of ethical and illegal abuses.  
  16 
In this study the concern is only with the abuse of 
preferential ACS treatment of athletes relative to non-
athletes. 
Of the many forces that are in reality or perception 
apt to favor preferential treatment for athletes, the 
primary one is economics.  Bailey and Littleton (1991) 
state that there is an undeniable appeal and entertainment 
power of sports.  This power is used to strengthen the 
institution's ties with numerous constituencies and to 
affect directly or indirectly its base of financial 
support.  But to some extent this type of justification, 
economic and social rather than academic, tends to 
emphasize further the tenuous and separatist relationship 
that athletics in large-scale operations seem to have with 
the institution’s central mission (Bailey & Littleton, 
1991, p. 36).  
Although the Naval Academy has not historically seen 
the extreme abuses its civilian counterparts have, it has 
not escaped the ethical disruption that lies latent in the 
separated athletic subculture.  During the time period 
covered by this study there have been numerous conduct 
cases, at both minor and major levels, that have involved 
key athletes in key sports, including the football team’s 
starting quarterback.  The visibility of such a case is 
magnified by the visibility of the athletic program, thus 
making it one of those cases that Admiral Boorda (1990) 
says will be followed closely by the Brigade of midshipmen.  
The consequences of such a case influence the perceptions 
about the Naval Academy, both internally and externally.  
Bailey and Littleton (1991) remark that the management of 
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these stresses, which are often competing, must be balanced 
to protect the viability of the program and the climate of 
the institution. 
E. THE FOUR CLASS SYSTEM 
This section explains the Naval Academy’s four-class 
system and briefly discusses how it relates to the Conduct 
System.  There is no literature regarding the relationship 
between class and the Conduct System.  The perspectives 
generated for this review were obtained by multiple 
discussions with Naval Academy personnel that work directly 
or closely with the Conduct System. 
The Naval Academy’s class system, not to be mistaken 
for graduating class, is a rank and development system 
associated with the year midshipmen are in relative to the 
four-year system that regular civilian universities use.  
Midshipmen in their first year, equivalent to Freshmen, are 
called Plebes or Fourth-Class (4/C) Midshipmen, Sophomores 
are Third-Class (3/C) Midshipmen, Juniors are Second-Class 
(2/C) Midshipmen, and Seniors are First-Class (1/C) 
Midshipmen.   
This distinction of class is not just a marker for 
which year the midshipmen are currently in, but is a system 
of rank and professional development.  According to 
Waypoints (2001), the four-year system is designed to 
prepare midshipmen to accept the lifelong challenge of 
leadership, both military and civilian.  The system 
incrementally provides skills and experiences that build 
upon each other and take midshipmen from the role of 
follower to the role of leader.  
  18 
In relation to the Conduct System the four-class 
system emphasizes accountability for the highest standards 
of conduct at every level.  This emphasis starts with 
individual behavior at the 4/C year and matures into 
accountability for, and development of, the conduct of 
one’s juniors by the 1/C year.  From this class system 
standpoint there are many potential perspectives for 
achieving equity.  Three possible sets of perspectives that 
could be derived as possible Conduct System associations to 
class are discussed. 
The first perspective for applying equity 
differentiates punishment according to the inputs of 
experience, maturity, and level of indoctrination.  Thus, 
when a 4/C midshipman commits a conduct offense, he or she 
is given the benefit of the doubt due to inexperience and 
either is not reported at all, but just counseled, or, if 
reported, is possibly given a lighter punishment.  However, 
being an upper-class midshipman comes with the expectation 
that one should know better and is not setting a good 
example for the lower classes.  Under this perspective it 
is probable that the higher the midshipman’s class, the 
greater the likelihood of being reported and being more 
harshly punished.   
The second perspective is just the opposite of the 
first.  Plebes, and 3/C midshipmen, would be reported and 
punished to the maximum limits of possible demerits the 
offense warrants in an effort to teach the lesson of 
accountability for their actions early.  Upper-class 
midshipmen would be less likely to be reported by their 
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peers, but when they are, they are punished at a lower end 
of the range of possible demerits.   
The third perspective is that the Conduct System would 
treat all conduct offenses equally in terms of 
consequences, and there would be no distinctions with 
regard to a midshipman’s rank.  In the purest sense, this 
means that the punishment for misconduct would be purely 
objective, and based solely on the merits of the offense. 
F. GENDER AND MINORITIES 
This section examines the theoretical concepts that 
account for the current treatment of women and minorities 
in organizations in terms of the cultural issues in the 
context of integration.  
According to John Bodnar (1999), just as the military 
is a microcosm of American society, so the Naval Academy is 
a microcosm of military society.  And just as society, both 
American and military, has struggled with integration along 
gender and racial lines, so has the Naval Academy.  It has 
only been three generations since virtually all naval 
officers were upper middle-class white Christian males; 
today’s Navy is an aggregation of diverse races, colors, 
creeds, and gender (Bodnar, 1999, p. 289).  Along with the 
demographic changes that have occurred in the naval officer 
corps, there has been a change in the military culture.  
This change, or the evolution of integration by stages, is 
at a slow but continuous pace, hindered by the constant 
coexistence of two generations at the Naval Academy. 
The two specific generations at the Naval Academy are 
the current midshipmen and the senior leadership, which 
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represents up to twenty-five years of separation (Bodnar, 
1999, p. 290).  Additionally, Bodnar (1999) states that 
different values and political beliefs of young people 
formed during youth stay with them for the remainder of 
their lives.  Imbedded in these values and beliefs are the 
ideas of gender roles and minority integration.  In a 
related quote, Albert Einstein said, “Common sense is the 
collection of prejudices acquired by the age of 18.”  
Bodnar is not implying that the differences in values 
between generations are opposed, just that they are 
different to varying degrees based on the experiences and 
perceptions of each generation.  This difference may lead 
to a propensity for a clash of values and an exceedingly 
slow change in any real outlook toward any gender or 
minority related issue (Bodnar, 1999).  This study examines 
the current treatment of gender and minority status as 
manifested in the Naval Academy’s Conduct System as just 
one measure of integration.  
Out of the most noteworthy and applicable papers found 
to support this study’s premise was that of Jana L. 
Pershing (2001), “Gender Disparities In Enforcing The Honor 
Concept At The U.S. Naval Academy.”  Although her study 
primarily focuses on gender, she also includes minority and 
athletic status to support her findings.  Despite the fact 
that the Naval Academy’s Honor System is separate from the 
Conduct System, their peer oriented disciplinary principles 
and administrations are not poles apart from each other.  
On the whole, the midshipmen do have more control over the 
Honor System than the Conduct System.  Admiral Boorda 
(1990) tied them together by citing them both as examples 
of mechanisms essential to the successful accomplishment of 
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the Academy’s mission to instill values and behavior of the 
highest ideals. 
Like other literature that focuses on gender and 
minority treatment within organizations, Pershing too uses 
the lens of integration to set the context of her study.  
Although there are also parallels to how women and 
minorities are treated in statistically white male 
dominated institutions, Pershing highlights the fact that 
there is still a difference in treatment of women and 
treatment of minorities because of their different role 
identities.  For example a woman’s role in society is much 
different than a male minority’s role, and although some 
issues related to integration are shared, there also are 
differences.  There are still differences in the leadership 
positions available to women (e.g. combat positions) that 
not only fail to create a climate in which men and women 
are seen as equals but actually may exacerbate conflicts 
(Pershing, 2001, p. 420).  Combat related position is just 
one example of a role a minority male would not share with 
a female. 
Regarding the presence of women and minorities as a 
relatively small group, Pershing (2001) cites Rosabeth 
Kanter’s landmark study on integration into large male-
dominated corporations to provide insight into the unique 
status of women and minorities in the military given their 
presence, as Kanter would describe it, as “a token 
population” (p. 420).  Likewise, Durning (1978) concluded 
that the “numerical rarity” of women at the Naval Academy 
was a contributing factor to the high-ranking problems of 
over-visibility and negative male attitudes. 
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To summarize Pershing’s study, she found that 
polarization affects the enforcement of the Honor System to 
the disfavor of women and to a lesser extent, minorities.  
In addition, Pershing (2001) also draws parallels between 
gender, minority, and athletic status using the notion of 
enhanced visibility and peer loyalty to elucidate disparate 
over-representative treatment and the perceptions of these 
being sub-performing groups.  Thus, compared to 
representation in terms of percentage of graduating class 
makeup, their representation in honor offenses is higher, 
or over-representative, than that of white males. These 
findings are not unique to the military either; a recent 
report issued by the American Bar Association (2001) found 
that girls are punished more harshly than boys for minor 
criminal behavior.  The irony of Pershing’s findings is 
that, according to the Naval Academy’s Values Survey, there 
is a perception among the majority of midshipmen that all 
subgroups discussed in this thesis are treated fairly or 
with a favorable bias. 
Literatures on minority groups in military 
organizations are substantial.  From literature as far back 
as 1973 by Charles Moskos to a GAO report of 1993 the 
findings are similar.  While researchers find a greater 
degree of racial equality in the military than any other 
areas of American life, nevertheless there still exists 
inequity and disparity for minorities (Moskos, 1973).  In 
fact, Moskos (1973) states that the more military the 
environment, the more egalitarian the racial relations.  Of 
the many conditions that Moskos concludes will override 
racial differences, the one germane to the Naval Academy is 
the similarities in socio-educational backgrounds.   
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Twenty years after the report by Moskos, the GAO 
(1993) report on gender and racial disparities at the Naval 
Academy echoed his thoughts.  The GAO used statistical 
significance tests and a rule of thumb test based on 
comparisons of subgroup percentages to assess the 
significance of gender and racial disparities.  The report 
showed that both women and minorities did not fare as well 
as men with regard to class standing, academic, physical 
education, military performance, and attrition rates (GAO, 
1993, p. 2).  Specific to conduct, the report found that 
both female and minority 4/C midshipmen were convicted of 
conduct offenses at a higher rate than white 4/C midshipmen 
(GAO, 1993, pp. 26 & 46). 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided a basic understanding of the 
Naval Academy’s Administrative Conduct System.  
Additionally, the variables identified by the research 
question have been examined in the context of the Conduct 
System or related disciplinary systems.  Athletes espouse a 
value to an academic institution that may transcend 
academia; because of this their conduct becomes highly 
visible and scrutinized.  The four-class system at the 
Naval Academy, though it is the scheme by which midshipmen 
are groomed into officers, it is also a measure of 
expectations of behavior over time.  Gender and minority 
issues, though with their differences, encompass the 
challenges of integration that are evident in predominantly 
and historically white male dominated institutions. 
The intention of this literature review was to provide 
insight into areas that have already been examined on the 
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often interrelated topics discussed above.  These insights 
were specifically chosen to be useful in providing some 
additional insight in this analysis.  The following chapter 
(Chapter III) extends the previous discussion by relating 
the data collected for this study to the variables 
discussed in this literature review. 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the principal data sources, 
variables, and statistical methods used in this study. 
B. DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
Data for this thesis were obtained through the United 
States Naval Academy (USNA) Institutional Research Center 
(IRC).  The primary database was the USNA Midshipmen 
Information System, also known as MIDS.  MIDS is an 
administrative software system that faculty, staff, and 
midshipmen use to enter and retrieve information from the 
USNA corporate database.   MIDS was implemented at the 
Academy in 1999 and all prior data were merged into it.  
Multiple Ad Hoc Queries were performed to draw from MIDS 
all conduct associated information producing recorded 
conduct offenses from the classes of 1998-2005, which 
covers academic years 1995-2002.  This initially produced 
17,216 individual conduct offense cases. 
Specific demographic data on gender, ethnicity, and 
athletic status also were drawn from MIDS.  In order to 
complete missing demographic data created by MIDS, the 
Admissions database, also accessible by IRC, was used for 
gender and ethnicity data.  The MIDS and Admissions data 
were merged using midshipmen MIDS identification numbers 
and social security numbers as the merge criteria. 
From the initial sample of 17,216 cases, 7,704 were 
analyzed.  The 9,512 cases were excluded for four reasons 
according to the following sequence of operations.  First, 
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for case data to be used in conduct calculations they had 
to be affirmatively validated in the VALIDATE conduct 
attribute of MIDS by the Conduct Officer.  Cases that were 
not validated were excluded.  Second, cases that were still 
under investigation or had missing data in the STATUS 
attribute were excluded. The first and second criteria 
account for 533 of the excluded cases.  Third, the 
graduating classes 2002-2005 did not have complete data for 
all four midshipmen years, and therefore they were 
excluded.  This accounted for 7,681 excluded cases.  The 
remaining graduating classes of 1998-2001 were homogeneous 
in that each had complete data for all four midshipmen 
classes.  Finally, cases that were dismissed and therefore 
were not subjected to an Adjudicating Authority’s awarding 
of punishment were excluded, accounting for the last 1,298 
cases. 
The survey results from the USNA Values Survey were 
obtained through IRC.  This survey polls 1/C, 2/C, and 3/C 
midshipmen on numerous issues of which those regarding the 
Conduct System were selected for this study.   
     1. Dependent Variable 
PUNISH is the dependent variable for the regression 
model.  PUNISH is measured in terms of the demerits awarded 
by an Adjudicating Authority as punishment for a given 
offense.  Demerits were chosen as the single measure of 
punishment for this study because they affect the conduct 
status of midshipmen.  A midshipman’s semester conduct 
grade is based solely upon his/her demerit level for a 
particular semester (Commandant of Midshipmen, 2000, p. 4-
3).  The distribution of PUNISH is shown in Table 1. 
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Demerits for either major or minor offenses are 
awarded in accordance with guidelines set forth in the 
“Table of Maximum Demerits” in Appendix A of the Conduct 
Manual (Commandant of Midshipmen, 2000, p. 4-3). 
Table 1. Frequency of PUNISH 
















































The 11.4 percent of the cases for which zero demerits 
are awarded represent cases when other forms of punishment 
may have been awarded instead of demerits, or no punishment 
at all was awarded. 
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     2. Independent Variables 
The Independent Variables were chosen and limited by 
areas of interest identified in previous studies, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, and the USNA Values Survey. 
a. Athletic Status 
Athletic Status (ATHLETE) is characterized by the 
Naval Academy as a midshipman who has participated in a 
varsity sport and was a varsity letter winner in that 
sport.  The variable ATHLETE was coded as 0 for Non-Athlete 
and 1 for Athlete.   
b. Minority Status 
Minority Status was determined by ethnic codes 
entered into the admissions database.  Two sets of 
variables were coded.  First, due to the relatively small 
representation of individual minority groups, all 
individuals that did not fall into the majority group 
(Caucasian or Non-Minority) were combined into a single 
group (Non-Caucasian or Minority).  This variable is called 
MINORITY and was coded by 0 for Caucasian and 1 for Non-
Caucasian.  Of the 1,909 minorities in this data 
population, 297 were also female.   
After preliminary regression analysis Minority 
Status was further broken down into minority groups and 
recoded into separate variables; Caucasian (CA=1), African-
American (AF=1), Hispanic and Puerto Rican (HI_PU=1), 
Native Hawaiian/American and Pacific Islander (NH_NA=1), 
Asian-American and Filipino (AS_FI=1) and Other or Missing 
(OT_MI=1).  In each recoded variable all others were coded 
with a 0 (Others =0).  Table 2 shows the distribution of 
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the aforementioned variables, with 0.1 percent lost to 
rounding. 
Table 2. Frequency of Minority Groups 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT CUMULATIVE 
PERCENT 
African-American 772 10.0 10.0 
Hispanic & Puerto 
Rican 
700 9.1 19.1 
Asian-American & 
Filipino 




91 1.2 24.3 
Others & Missing 34 0.4 24.7 
Caucasian 5795 75.2 99.9 
 
An additional analysis of MINORITY required the 
recoding of MINORITY to reflect possible integration with 
ATHLETE.  The Frequency of MINORITY-ATHLETE (MINATH) 
presented in Table 3 represents this recoding. 
















GENDER was created to separate males from 
females.  This variable also was drawn from admissions 
data.  GENDER was coded as 0 for male and 1 for female.   
Post Hoc analysis of GENDER required the recoding 
of GENDER to reflect possible integration with other 
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independent variables, specifically MINORITY and ATHLETE.  
The Frequencies, Table 4, represents this recoding. 










































The variable CLASS was categorized in accordance 
with the four-class system and coded as follows: CLASS1  
(1=1/C Midshipmen, 0=All Others), CLASS2 (1=2/C Midshipmen, 
0=All Others), CLASS3 (1=3/C Midshipmen, 0=All Others), and 
CLASS4 (1=4/C Midshipmen, 0=All Others).  Table 5 shows a 
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e. Level of Offense 
Level of Offense (LEVOFF) divides the seriousness 
of the offense into two categories: Minor, coded with 0, 
and Major, coded with 1.  When an offense is reported it is 
given a four-digit code (OFFECODE) specific to that 
offense, which carries a label of either being a Major or 
Minor offense.  Demerits are administered based on this 
four-digit code using the “Table of Maximum Demerits.”  
Table 6 shows the Frequency of LEVOFF. 














To further break down LEVOFF, OFFECODE, a 
variable that lists each specific offense code in each 
case, was recoded into four different variables (CAT1_OFF 
through CAT4_OFF) according to the maximum number of 
demerits that can be awarded totally to that code.  Each 
new variable is code with a 1 for offenses within the 
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demerit range of that category and with a 0 for all others. 
Table 7 shows a frequency distribution of this recode.   
Table 7. Frequency of CAT1_OFF through CAT4_OFF 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Cat 1  Demerits  
00-10 
1702 22.1 22.1 
Cat 2 Demerits  
10-20  
1173 15.2 37.3 
Cat 3 Demerits  
20-35 
3183 41.3 78.6 
Cat 4 Demerits  
35-100 
1646 21.4 100.0 
 
f. Number of Secondary Offenses Considered with 
Primary Case 
The number of secondary offenses (SCNDOFF) 
considered with the primary case is essential to this 
analysis due to the increased likelihood that a case with 
secondary offenses may yield a higher punishment within the 
range applicable to the offense.  SCNDOFF is coded as 0 
when no secondary offense is included with the primary case 
and 1 if one or more secondary offenses are included.  
Table 8 shows a Frequency check of SCNDOFF. 
Table 8. Frequency of SCNDOFF 
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g. Summary of Variables 
Table 9 lists each variable and its description.  
Each dichotomous variable’s coding is included in the 
description.  Each variable’s mean for the 7,704 cases used 
for the analysis also is listed. 
     3. USNA Values Survey 
The USNA Values Survey is given to 3/C, 2/C, and 1/C 
midshipmen at the beginning of each year to gain their 
perspective and insight on a wide variety of midshipmen 
issues.  It is not given to 4/C midshipmen because at the 
beginning of the year they only have their Plebe Summer 
experiences to draw from, which is insufficient to complete 
the survey. This survey includes a section on the Conduct 
System where questions regarding consistency and biases are 
asked.  The results of this survey are compared with the 
statistical analysis to determine whether or not they are 
congruent. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
     This thesis analyzes the consistency of punishment as 
measured by demerits awarded (PUNISH) to determine the 
likelihood that one or more groups represented by the 
independent variables are punished disparately.  The 
specification for the initial regression model is: 
       PUNISH = b0 + b1 ATHLETE + b2 MINORITY + b3 GENDER +  
            b4 CLASS2 + b5 CLASS3 + b6 CLASS4 + b7 LEVOFF + b8 SCNDOFF 
       CLASS1 was excluded.   
     Following the analysis of the initial model, revised 
models were developed based on the statistically 
significant variables of the initial model. 
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Table 9. Summary of Variables 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION MEAN 
PUNISH Dependent Variable:  0-100 Demerits awarded by increments 
of 5 
20.15 
ATHLETE 1=Athlete (Varsity Letter Winner), 0=Non-Athlete .24 
MINORITY 1=Minority (Non-Caucasian), 0=Non-Minority (Caucasian) .25 
MINATH 1=Minority-Athlete, 0=All Others .04 
CA 1=Caucasian, 0=All Others .75 
AF 1=African-American, 0=All Others .10 
HI_PU 1=Hispanic & Puerto Rican, 0=All Others .09 
NH_NA 1=Native American/Hawaiian & Pacific Islander, 0=All Others .01 
AS_FI 1=Asian American & Filipino, 0=All Others .04 
OT_MI 1=Other & Missing, 0=All Others 
There was no missing attributes 
.004 
GENDER 1=Female, 0=Male .13 
FEMATH 1=Female-Athlete, 0=All Others .037 
FMMINATH 1=Female-Minority-Athlete, 0=All Others .005 
FEMMIN 1=Female-Minority, 0=All Others .038 
CLASS1 1=1/C Midshipmen, 0=All Others .43 
CLASS2 1=2/C Midshipmen, 0=All Others .27 
CLASS3 1=3/C Midshipmen, 0=All Others .18 
CLASS4 1=4/C Midshipmen, 0=All Others .11 
LEVOFF 1=Major Level Offense, 0=Minor Level Offense .18 
CAT 
 I_OFF 
1=Category I Level Offense (00-10 Demerits) 
0=All Others 
.22 
CAT II_OFF 1=Category II Level Offense (10-20 Demerits) 
0=All Others 
.15 





1=Category IV Level Offense (35-100 Demerits) 
0=All Others 
.21 
SCNDOFF 1= One or more Secondary Offenses included with primary 
offense case, 0=No Secondary Offenses 
.14 
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D. INITIAL EXPECTATIONS 
The goal of this analysis was to test the following 
null hypothesis: 
There is no inconsistency of punishment across 
time or between subgroups.   
 
The testing of this null hypothesis was based on the 
statistical significance for each independent variable in 
the model evaluated at the 0.05 level.  Due to the large 
sample size the statistical power of the analysis is high 
and very small differences might prove significant.  
The expected signs of the coefficient are listed below 
in Table 10.  A positive sign (+) indicates the predicted 
value for the number of demerits awarded (PUNISH) is 
hypothesized to increase when the value of the independent 
variable increases.  A negative sign (-) means that the 
predicted value of PUNISH decreases when the value of the 
independent variable increases.  A question mark (?) means 
there is no clear expectation. 
Table 10. Expected Signs of Independent Variables 
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     Expected signs were derived logically from insights 
gained in the Literature Review (Chapter II). First, the 
discussion of athletes and their relationship with academia 
leads to an expectation of leniency, which would be 
represented by a negative coefficient, or fewer demerits.  
For minorities and women, all things being equal, a 
positive coefficient is expected, to represent that they 
are likely to be punished with more demerits than Caucasian 
men. In regards to class, there are multiple perspectives 
that could explain how different classes are punished, and 
therefore no clear expectation exists.  Finally, though it 
does not require a regression to show that level of 
offenses and secondary offenses will have positive 
coefficients, they are demonstrating relative weight within 
the entire model compared to the demographics. 
Additionally, correlations run on all the variables are 
used in examining zero order relationships (refer to 
Appendix A).   
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The final data file used for this analysis contains 
7,704 midshipmen conduct cases from the classes 1998 
through 2001 that were subjectively awarded punishment by 
an Adjudicating Authority.  There are no missing data.  The 
variables are analyzed using a multiple linear regression 
model in which statistical significance coupled with 
coefficient sign is the basis for analysis, discussion and 
conclusions.   
  37 
IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of the multiple 
linear regression analysis and the results of the USNA 
Values Survey.  The statistical analysis also is 
interpreted and compared with the surveyed perceptions.  
Overall, by answering the research questions this analysis 
reveals which sub-groups, represented by the independent 
variables, are punished inconsistently with demerits. 
B. STATISTICAL RESULTS 
This section begins by presenting univariate 
descriptive statistics that support some of the ideas 
discussed in Chapter II.  However, univariate results can 
be deceptive; therefore, a series of multiple linear 
regressions are presented.  
     1. Descriptive and Crosstab Analysis 
Pershing (2001) assumes a specific group’s 
representation by violation cases reported under the Honor 
System should not exceed their representation in the 
Brigade of Midshipmen.  If it does, this may indicate 
inconsistent or, as she declares, “disparate” treatment of 
the particular group in question.  For example, in her 
study, in 1993 women comprised 8.4 percent of the Brigade 
but accounted for 18.2 percent of the Honor Violation 
cases.  According to Pershing (1990) this indicates the 
presence of possible inconsistent treatment. 
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By taking the numbers and percentages of athletes, 
females, and minorities conduct cases and comparing them to 
Brigade numbers and percentages, this study connects the 
Pershing study logic with the Conduct System.  For the 
purpose of establishing a benchmark for determining a 
Brigade average, the graduate demographics for the 
graduating classes of 1998-2001 were provided by the USNA 
IRC.  This information is represented in Table 11, which 
compares athlete, female, and minority graduate totals 
(with percent of associated class) with conduct case totals 
(with percent of conduct cases for that class).  
Additionally, Table 12 presents the Descriptive Statistics 
on all variables discussed in this thesis and Appendix F 
presents Crosstabulations and Chi-Squares of all four 
subgroups in relation to LEVOFF and SECNDOFF. 
Table 11: Graduating Class and Conduct Statistics by 
























1998 360/39.0 241/22.5 139/15.1 136/12.7 172/18.6 317/29.6 
1999 315/35.5 331/24.8 134/15.1 149/11.2 165/18.6 358/26.9 
2000 233/24.6 664/26.6 133/14.0 402/16.1 159/16.8 478/19.1 
2001 204/22.1 589/21.0 153/16.6 345/12.3 176/19.1 756/27.0 
Total 1112/30.2 1825/23.7 559/15.2 1032/13.4 672/18.3 1909/24.8 
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a. ATHLETE  
According to IRC, athletes, as defined by this 
study, averaged 30.2 percent of the graduating classes 
between 1998 and 2001.  During the same period of time 
athletes accounted for 23.7 percent of the conduct cases 
used for this study.  The result of a Chi-Square test (Chi-
Square = 155.163; d.f. = 1; critical value = 12.706) using 
athlete’s Brigade graduate representation (30.2%) to 
determine the expected frequency of cases is significant.  
This suggests that there is a relationship between athletes 
and the frequency of offenses, with respect to LEVOFF, that 
may be inconsistent and may contribute to a bias that 
favors athletes. 
 b. MINORITY   
IRC data indicate that minorities made up 18.3 
percent of the graduating classes between 1998 and 2001.  
Minorities as a whole have represented 24.8 percent of the 
conduct cases used for this study for the same class years.  
This exceeds their representation by 6.5 percent and may be 
indicative of inconsistent treatment.   
Further study would be required to definitively 
determine whether or not this initial sign of inconsistency 
is due to the propensity for minorities to actually commit 
offenses at higher rates.  Bias exists if they are being 
reported/targeted at higher rates, possibly because of 
their visibility, compared to non-minorities but in fact 
commit no more offenses.  The result of a Chi-Square 
computation using minority’s Brigade graduate 
representation (18.3%) to determine the expected frequency 
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of cases is significant with a value of 217.145 (d.f. = 1; 
critical value = 12.706).  This suggests that there is a 
relationship between minorities and the frequency of 
offenses that may be inconsistent and may contribute to a 
bias that is against minorities. 
c. GENDER   
According to IRC, females averaged 15.2 percent 
of the graduating classes between 1998 and 2001.  During 
the same period of time females accounted for 13.4 percent 
of the conduct cases used in this study.  The result of a 
Chi-Square computation using female’s Brigade graduate 
representation (15.2%) to determine the expected frequency 
of cases is significant with a value of 26.610 (d.f. = 1; 
critical value = 12.706).  Though not as significant as the 
athlete subgroup, this suggests that there is a 
relationship between females and the frequency of offenses 
that may be inconsistent and may contribute to a bias that 
favors females.  In the results of both gender and athlete 
it may in fact be that they commit fewer offenses. 
d. CLASS   
The Descriptive Statistics for class reveals two 
possible scenarios.  First, as a midshipman progresses up 
the ranks (4/C to 1/), he or she commits more conduct 
offenses.  Second, as a midshipman progresses up the ranks 
he or she is more likely to be reported.  Which scenario is 
most accurate is not indicated by the descriptive results.  
To gain insight as to how conduct cases are distributed 
across the four-class system in relation to their 
graduating class, refer to Table 13. 
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Table 13. Crosstabulation of CLASS by Graduation Class 
Class * Graduation Class Crosstabulation
Count
382 542 1352 1029 3305
182 356 620 955 2113
257 210 363 581 1411
251 224 163 237 875












There are two distinct and important factors to 
understand and recognize by Table 13.  The first is to 
understand that the Academic Year 1998 is the only year in 
this study that includes all graduating classes during the 
same year.  In 1998 the 1/C midshipmen were the graduating 
class, and the 4/C were that of graduating class of 2001.  
During this time it is evident that 4/C midshipmen account 
for a substantially fewer number of cases than 3/C through 
1/C midshipmen.  The 1/C midshipmen account for the most 
cases during 1998, and in fact for all years they are 
represented in this study. 
The second factor to be noted is a large change 
in the number of cases from year to year starting with 
Academic Year 1998, with the largest being between the 
years of 1999 and 2000.  Numerous inquiries were made to 
the USNA IRC and the Conduct Office to explain this growth 
in adjudicated cases.  Three speculations were 
professionally surmised.  
First, with the creation and implementation of 
MIDS, complete merging of prior conduct data may be 
deficient.  Second, the Conduct System underwent some 
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transformation starting in 1998.  A significant change to 
the Conduct System was in the way conduct offenses are 
coded.  Prior to 1998 offenses were categorized by a level 
series (1000 to 6000) system, which went from least to most 
serious.  After 1998 offense levels were simplified to 
either Minor or Major.  The consequence of this change was 
a more user-friendly system, which may have increased 
reporting of offenses. 
Third, during the implementation of MIDS and the 
Conduct System transformation, the ability for midshipmen, 
faculty, and staff to report conduct offenses 
electronically via MIDS was created.  The electronic 
conduct offense report form (ACS Form 2) reduced the 
inevitability of confrontation between the offender and the 
accuser.  Psychologically, less confrontation may have 
equated to an increase in reported cases.  It could be just 
one or the cumulative effect of all these factors that 
accounts for the increased caseloads.   
Regardless, the fact remains that 4/C midshipmen 
cases are generally fewer than those of 3/C through 1/C in 
all years used during this study, as represented in Figure 
1, with the exception of 2/C midshipmen in 1998 and 3/C 
midshipmen in 1999. 
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This occurs even though attrition rates over four years 
mean that there are fewer midshipmen from class to class 
from 4/C up to 1/C midshipmen.  Applying the Pershing study 
logic suggests some inconsistency over time, which 
indicates as midshipmen go from 4/C to 1/C they are more 
likely to be reported for a conduct offense. 
As with the results of Minorities, further study 
would be required to determine whether or not this initial 
sign of inconsistency is due to the propensity for 
different classes to actually commit more offenses.  It may 
be that 1/C cases are reported at higher rates in accord 
with organizational norms and values discussed in Chapter 
2. 
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     2. Regression Analysis 
The initial specification for the regression model is 
represented by the following expression. 
PUNISH= b0 + b1ATHLETE + b2MINORITY + b3GENDER + 
b4CLASS2 + b5CLASS3 + b6CLASS4 + b7LEVOFF + 
b8SCNDOFF 
The regression results of this model specification are 
listed in Table 14.  The R Square tells us that 66.8 
percent of the observed variability of PUNISH (Number of 
Demerits Awarded) is explained by the eight independent 
variables.  Additionally, the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
confirms the linear relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables.  
The coefficients for the independent variables are 
listed in Table 14.  Seven of the eight independent 
variables contributed significantly to predicting the 
number of demerits awarded (PUNISH) and all coefficients 
were positive.   
a. ATHLETE   
Athletic Status (ATHLETE) is not significant. 
Thus, the regression does not support a claim, that if an 
athlete has committed an offense he/she will be given fewer 
demerits than others committing a similar offense. 
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Table 14. Initial Multiple Linear Regression Results 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), Secondary Offense, Minority
Status, 3/C Midshipmen, Athletic Status, Gender, 4/C













Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Secondary Offense, Minority Status, 3/C Midshipmen,
Athletic Status, Gender, 4/C Midshipmen, 2/C Midshipmen, Level of Offense
a. 
Dependent Variable: Number of Demerits Awardedb. 
 
Coefficientsa
8.534 .269 31.685 .000
.101 .357 .002 .282 .778
.964 .351 .018 2.742 .006
1.351 .447 .020 3.023 .003
2.869 .372 .056 7.722 .000
4.917 .424 .083 11.599 .000
4.051 .509 .056 7.958 .000
45.116 .437 .746 103.184 .000


























**Excluded Variable:  CLASS1 (1/C Midshipmen) 
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b. MINORITY   
Minority Status (MINORITY) is both significant 
and positive.  This indicates that minorities, everything 
else being equal, are awarded an average of 0.964 more 
demerits than non-minorities represented by the Constant.   
In an effort to resolve which specific minorities 
within the group are awarded more demerits, an additional 
regression was run with each minority grouping as 
delineated in Chapter III (Refer to Appendix B for 
Regression of Minority Groups).  The results of this post 
hoc regression found African American and Asian-American & 
Filipino received significantly more demerits than the 
reference group – Caucasians.  Additionally, the regression 
of Minority-Athlete (MINATH), as presented in Appendix C, 
did not uncover any significance with minorities who are 
also athletes. 
c. GENDER   
Gender (GENDER) is significant and positive.  
This indicates that females, everything else being equal, 
are awarded an average of 1.351 more demerits than males.  
Additionally, because the Pershing study linked gender with 
minorities and athletes, a separate regression was run with 
GENDER integrated and recoded with the independent 
variables ATHLETE and MINORITY to become Female-Athlete, 
Female-Minority, and Female-Minority-Athlete.  The result 
of this post hoc regression, as presented in Appendix C, 
did not discover significance with females that share 
demographic tags with minorities and athletes. 
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d. CLASS   
All class ranks (CLASS2-4) were very significant 
with positive coefficients.  The statistical result that 
3/C midshipmen are likely to receive an average of 4.917 
more demerits than 1/C midshipmen, 0.866 more than 4/C 
midshipmen.   
e. LEVOFF  
Level of Offense (LEVOFF) is significant and has 
a positive coefficient.  This result indicates that 
midshipmen who commit a Major level offense receive an 
average of 45.116 more demerits than those who commit Minor 
offenses.   Within the R Square of .668, LEVOFF accounts 
for approximately .646 of the R Square when run with just 
LEVOFF as the independent variable, presented in Appendix 
D.   
An additional regression was run with LEVOFF 
recoded into four categories according to the maximum 
number of demerits that can be awarded for a specific 
conduct offense code (OFFCODE).  Category II was excluded 
as for the purpose of a reference group.  The results, as 
expected, are consistent with LEVOFF and are presented in 
Appendix D.  In both regressions, as expected the more 
serious the offense the more demerits awarded. 
f. SCNDOFF  
Secondary Offenses are significant and positive.   
This result indicates that Midshipmen who have secondary 
offenses attached to their primary offense case receive an 
average of 7.736 more demerits than midshipmen with no 
secondary offenses attached. 
 
  49 
 
C. PRESENTATION OF USNA VALUES SURVEY RESULTS 
Though the USNA Values Survey has served as a 
mechanism for initiating this study, more importantly, it 
is an instrument against which to assess the statistical 
analysis.  The questions that deal directly with the 
consistency of the Conduct system and the independent 
variables are presented.  Later in this chapter these 
questions are compared to the interpreted statistical 
analysis of the case data.   
The first question for establishing the perception of 
consistency starts with the notion of how punishment is 
awarded throughout the Brigade, Company to Company.  Table 
16 presents the question and results.  The results reflect 
the point made by Admiral Boorda (1990). 
Table 16. Perception of Company-to-Company Consistency 
63.  The administration of the Conduct System is consistent from company to company. 
                            Strongly Agree & Agree Neither Disagree & Strongly Disagree  
Year        
1998 14%  23%  64%   
1999 14%  20%  66%   
2000 16%  21%  63%   
2001 17%  21%  63%   
AVG% 15.25%  21.25%  64%   
 
Boorda (1990) reported the following, which speaks 
directly to the results in Table 16: 
     One manifestation of the problem is when two or 
more midshipmen in different companies, who together 
or even at different times commit the same offense 
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(like and related/unrelated offenses), they may 
receive widely different punishments.  While 
recognizing that leadership styles will differ, the 
wide disparities, at best, give an appearance of 
inequity. (p.22) 
Additionally, the idea of consistency is again asked 
regarding the perception of “the disciplinary action taken 
on those found in violation of the Conduct System” (refer 
to Table 17).  Though the contexts in which a midshipman 
may answer this question may vary, this study’s context 
addresses the sub-groups identified in the independent 
variables.  Note the change in results for options (a) and 
(c) after 1998, which coincides with the transformation of 
the Conduct System.  
Table 17. Perception of Disciplinary Action (Punishment)   
68.  Which of the following statements most accurately reflects your opinion of the  
disciplinary action taken for those found in violation of the Conduct System? 
     1998 1999 2000 2001 
a.  Disciplinary action is generally fair and appropriate. 20% 28% 28% 27% 
b.  Disciplinary action is generally too harsh.  28% 31% 30% 31% 
c.  Disciplinary action is generally too lenient.  12% 3% 4% 4% 
d.  Disciplinary action is too inconsistent.  37% 38% 38% 38% 
 
Consistency with regard to punishment does not always 
imply that the same offense will receive the same 
punishment every time, but if the punishment deviates from 
expectations, either by seeming excessive (harsh) or 
insufficient (lenient), a perception of inequity may occur.  
Table 17 illustrates this perception of inconsistency with 
the percentages of respondents stating that punishment was 
other than “fair and appropriate” ranging from 72% to 77% 
each year, a clear majority.  For comparison, using the 
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same definition of consistency for the same question asked 
by the Values Survey about the Honor System yields a range 
of 51% to 67%. 
The principal question for this study concerns 
perceptions of bias relating to gender, minorities, and 
athletes as shown in Table 18.  The Table is broken into 
two groups with the first being the way the question was 
asked from 1998-1999.  The second group represents how the 
question was asked from 2000-2001.  From both groups it is 
evident that a substantial portion, on average 46%, of the 
Brigade perceives Athletes as getting preferential 
treatment (“Biased in Favor of”) by the Conduct System.   
An interesting note of contrast between the two groups 
of questions is the shift in results when midshipmen are 
given the choice of “Administered Fairly” in Group II over 
“Neither” in Group I.  These two choices are not 
equivalent.  Of particular note, the “Biased in Favor of” 
results increase by 2% for athletes, and a considerable 10% 
increase for women.  Due to a limitation of this study, it 
is unclear whether perceptions really changed or rather 
that the respondents interpreted the questions differently. 
     In summary, it is evident that a clear majority of the 
Brigade surveyed perceives that there are inconsistencies 
in the administration of awarding punishment by the Conduct 
System.  Though the perception of inconsistency is somewhat 
reduced when questions are asked about sub-groups, the 
results are still substantial enough to warrant a 
statistical analysis.  
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Table 18. Perceptions of Bias 
Group I (Questions as asked from 1998-1999)    
The administration of the Conduct System is biased against:   
         Strongly Agree/Agree Neither    Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
Women 1998 9% 28%  63%   
 1999 6% 27%  67%   
        
Men 1998 22% 32%  46%   
 1999 21% 32%  47%   
        
Minorities 1998 10% 30%  60%   
 1999 7% 31%  62%   
        
Athletes 1998 13% 26%  61%   
 1999 12% 28%  60%   
        
The administration of the Conduct System is biased in favor of:  
         Strongly Agree/Agree Neither    Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
Women 1998 35% 28%  37%   
 1999 36% 27%  37%   
        
Men 1998 8% 31%  61%   
 1999 5% 32%  64%   
        
Minorities 1998 23% 33%  44%   
 1999 18% 35%  48%   
        
Athletes 1998 50% 24%  27%   
 1999 40% 28%  32%   
        
Group II (Question as asked from 2000-2001)     
Using the following scale, what is your perception of the overall administration of the 
Conduct System with respect to the following groups:   
A.  Administered Fairly      
B.  Biased Against      
C.  Biased in Favor of      
                    Administered Fairly     Biased Against Biased in Favor of 
  2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 
69.  Women 50% 52% 3% 4% 47% 44% 
70.  Men  75% 75% 24% 24% 1% 1% 
71.  Minorities 76% 76% 6% 6% 18% 18% 
72.  Varsity Athletes 37% 42% 11% 16% 52% 42% 
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D. DATA INTERPRETATION 
 The interpretation of the statistical results 
presented in this study is presented in the context of 
demerits awarded using the first Research Question: 
1.) Are the punishments administered through the 
Naval Academy’s Conduct System consistently 
related to the intensity of the charged offense 
(a) across time and (b) independent of athletic 
status, minority status, gender, and class? 
First and foremost it is imperative to recognize that  
by the largest margin both the intensity of the offense, 
represented by the Level of Offense (LEVOFF) and the 
Secondary Offense (SCNDOFF) variables are the determinants 
of demerits awarded (PUNISH).  Together they account for 
approximately 0.660 (refer to Appendix D) of the total 
variance, which is 99 percent of the explained variance  
(0.668 R Squared).  Their Standardized Coefficients are 
0.746 and 0.118 respectively for a combined 0.864.  These 
results strongly indicate that Adjudicating Authorities, at 
the most fundamental level, are awarding demerits according 
to intensity of the charged offense.  It does not take a 
regression model to illustrate that punishments are related 
to the level of offense.  But including LEVOFF and SCNDOFF 
in the regression model helps to illustrate the practical 
importance of the demographic variables. 
     Although the demographics of athletic status 
(ATHLETE), minority status (MINORITY), gender (GENDER), and 
class (CLASS2-4) only account for approximately one percent 
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of the variance, with a combined Standardized Coefficient 
of 0.235, their significance cannot be dismissed.  However, 
the interpretation must be tempered.  The demographic 
variables are not very important in the sense that is most 
relevant to the issues of institutional bias. 
     1. ATHLETE   
First, because athlete’s case representation was 6.2 
percent below their Brigade representation, this may 
suggest that either they are not reported equally compared 
to non-athletes, or because of their athletic status they 
are better disciplined and actually commit fewer offenses.  
The regression results however, are not significant, which 
is consistent with the null hypothesis that athletes are 
treated fairly.  Of noteworthy interest, when an additional 
regression, as seen in Appendix E, was run with only Minor 
cases selected athletic status is marginally significant at 
0.066 with a small negative coefficient.  This is the 
closest the data comes to exhibiting preferential treatment 
for athletes. 
     2. MINORITY   
Because minority status is over represented in cases 
compared to Brigade representation, and because it is 
statistically significant with a positive coefficient in 
the regression, an inconsistency may exist.  All together, 
the statistics suggest that minorities commit more 
offenses, relative to their representation, and/or are more 
likely to be reported when they do in comparison to 
Caucasians.  Additionally, once subject to the Conduct 
System they are likely to receive more demerits than 
Caucasians.  It must be emphasized again, however, that 
  55 
very little of the variance in demerits is explained by 
minority status. 
Four questions immediately appear relevant in 
explaining this apparent disparate treatment.  First, do 
minorities commit more major offenses than non-minorities, 
which would account for them receiving more demerits?  No. 
Including level of offense (LEVOFF) in the regression model 
accounts for this possibility.  A Crosstabulation and Chi-
Square analysis performed between MINORITY and LEVOFF 
(refer to Appendix F) indicates that minorities and non-
minorities are within 1 percent of each other in commission 
of Major offenses (Minority=16.9%, Non-Minority=17.8%).  
The Chi-Square is not significant. 
Second, do minorities have a higher percentage of 
secondary offenses attached to their primary offense case 
than non-minorities?  No. Including secondary offenses 
(SCNDOFF) in the regression model also accounts for this 
possibility.  A Crosstabulation and Chi-Square analysis 
performed between MINORITY and SCNDOFF (refer to Appendix 
F) indicates that they are within 1 percent of each other 
(Minority=14.7%, Non-Minority=14.3%) and the Chi-Square is 
insignificant. Therefore, SCNDOFF is not likely to be a 
contributing factor to minorities receiving more demerits. 
Third, if it is assumed that repeat offenders may 
receive more punishment than the first time offender, are 
minorities more like to receive more demerits than non-
minorities?  Due to limitations of the data in this study, 
the exact percentage of repeat offenders could not be 
created to compare minorities and non-minorities.  However, 
minority cases are greater in number than their Brigade 
  56 
representation, suggesting that repeat offenders are 
relatively common.  Therefore, this may be a contributing 
factor to the significance of MINORITY. 
Fourth, is discrimination present in the Conduct 
System?  This question cannot be answered directly.  To 
claim there is no discrimination, one has to postulate that 
minorities have a greater propensity to commit offenses.  
The data used in this study provides no evidence on this 
point. 
     3. GENDER   
Gender, like athletic status, is less represented in 
cases than its representation in the Brigade, but unlike 
athletes, gender is statistically significant in the 
regression with a positive coefficient.  The fact that 
females commit offenses at a lower rate than their Brigade 
representation but like minorities are punished more 
heavily than the reference group of males is noteworthy.   
Represented by the results of the regression, gender 
has a higher coefficient indicating females may receive 
more demerits than minorities.  However the margin between 
females and minorities is very small and on the practical 
level, insignificant.   
Using the same four possibilities as used with 
minorities to explain the disparity in demerits awarded 
uncovers one interesting result.  In the results of the 
Crosstab/Chi-Square (Appendix F) of GENDER and SCNDOFF the 
Chi-Square tests is significant with a value that exceeds 
the critical value with one degree of freedom.  Therefore, 
a relationship exists between females and secondary 
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offenses that may or may not contribute to the significance 
of GENDER. 
     4. CLASS   
Class is the most interesting variable in considering 
both punishment over time and the norms and values within 
the Brigade related to the Conduct System.  The regression 
model results indicate that 3/C midshipmen are likely to 
receive more demerits than other classes when they enter 
the Conduct System and that 1/C midshipmen receive fewer 
demerits on average than members of other classes.   
Further, Crosstabs/Chi-Squares of CLASS1-4, LEVOFF and 
SCNDOFF were performed (refer to Appendix F).  The result 
was, though 4/C midshipmen generally account for the lowest 
number of cases of all classes in every year used in this 
study, with exceptions already noted, their cases have the 
highest percentage (23.1%) of Major level offenses, and 
still 3/C midshipmen, with 23.0% major offenses, receive 
more demerits.  The 1/C midshipmen Major level offenses 
only account for 13.0% of their cases.   
The cumulative results of all three findings lead to 
the following interpretation.  When a 1/C midshipman 
commits an offense it is likely to be minor, and he or she 
is very prone to being officially reported into the Conduct 
System.  Though the reason for this would require a more 
thorough analysis, this study concludes that 1/C midshipmen 
are expected to champion high standards of conduct and when 
they fail they are held officially accountable.   
There are at least two explanations as to why 1/C 
midshipmen receive fewer demerits than underclassmen.  
First, 1/C midshipmen have the highest level of privileges 
  58 
compared to lower classes and therefore are more likely to 
commit offenses at the Minor level, because many offenses 
are associated with the abuse of privileges.  Additionally, 
other forms of punishment, such as restriction, involve 
loss of privileges.  It is easier to impose alternative 
punishments on midshipmen who otherwise receive 
considerable privileges.  Such punishment may in fact be a 
more effective deterrent than demerits at this rank level. 
Near the other end of the spectrum are the 3/C 
midshipmen who have just been relieved from the rigors and 
excusals of Plebe year.  They are no longer the 
inexperienced young men and women they were when they 
entered the Academy.  They are expected to know what is 
right and wrong, and are unable to use unawareness as an 
excuse.  For this, and because that they have relatively 
fewer privileges to impinge on they are awarded more 
demerits. 
This interpretation speaks to the norms and values of 
the Brigade. In a preliminary inquiry, personnel familiar 
with the Conduct System confirmed this interpretation to be 
consistent with their experiences and perceptions of the 
Conduct System.  A more specific analysis is warranted to 
definitively confirm this.   
E. CORRELATION OF SURVEYED PERCEPTIONS VS. STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS 
     This section addresses the second research question: 
2.  Are midshipmen perceptions of the Conduct 
System congruent with the statistical analysis? 
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The variable, CLASS, is not surveyed with the Conduct 
System questions and will not be addressed in this section. 
     1. ATHLETE   
Between 40 to 52 percent of midshipmen between the 
years 1998 to 2001 believe that the Conduct System is 
“biased in favor of” athletes.  The statistical analysis 
does not support this perception.  For this perception to 
be accurate the regression result would have to be 
significant with a negative coefficient.  It is neither.   
One possible reason, statistically, that may explain 
the strong perception of favoritism toward athletes is 
revealed by their descriptive statistic.  The mean of 
athlete cases is lower than athlete representation within 
the Brigade.  This descriptive may support one who believes 
that a midshipman is less likely to be officially reported 
to the Conduct System because of his or her athletic 
status.  It is also reasonable to speculate the varsity 
teams may have disciplinary tools or measures that may 
prevent athlete offenses, or when they occur, to deal with 
the offenses.   
     2. MINORITY   
A substantial majority of midshipmen disagree/strongly 
disagree that the Conduct System is “biased against” 
minorities (60%-62% from 1998-1999), and in fact believe 
that they are treated “fairly” (76% from 2000-2001).  The 
statistical analysis leans somewhat in the opposite 
direction from the majority perception.  It appears that if 
a minority and Caucasian commit the same offense, the 
minority is likely to receive more demerits.  This 
statement implies that the Conduct System is biased against 
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minorities, at least relative to demerits awarded assuming 
the offenses are in fact equal.   
The practical significance that can be drawn from the 
regression analysis indicates that a minority may receive 
51 demerits when the Caucasian may receive 50.  At most, 
since demerits are awarded in increments of 5, a minority 
may receive as high as 55 demerits.  Though it is not clear 
to what degree midshipmen may consider punishment to be 
harsh or lenient, it is likely that the example above would 
not trigger either response.  Still, a “bias-against” 
attitude exists and it is evident in the surveyed 
perceptions that many midshipmen do not detect this small 
disparity. 
Consequently, the statistical analysis is not 
congruent with the 18 to 23 percent of midshipmen who 
perceive the Conduct system to be biased in favor of 
minorities.  Overall, the statistical analysis, both the 
Descriptives and the regression, is not congruent to the 
same degree with the perceptions of how minorities are 
administered demerits by the Conduct System.  To answer the 
bias questions purely on the statistical analysis the most 
accurate choice would lean more toward “biased against.”   
     3. GENDER   
Although never reaching a majority, a substantial 
percentage (35-47%) of midshipmen perceives the Conduct 
System is “biased in favor” of women.  From 2000-2001, the 
majority (50-52%) believed the Conduct System was 
“administered fairly” toward women.  Conversely, a very low 
percentage (3-9%) perceived the Conduct System “biased 
against” women.  In contrast to minorities, the fact that 
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female conduct cases are lower than their representation 
within the Brigade suggests a bias in favor of women, which 
is in line with the perception of the Brigade.  But with a 
statistically significant regression result and a positive 
coefficient, like minorities, a “bias against” women 
exists.   
Of noteworthy interest, fewer midshipmen perceive bias 
against women than perceive bias against minorities.  
Additionally, a larger percentage of the Brigade perceives 
bias in favor of women than the percentage perceiving bias 
in favor of minorities.  With the regression results 
indicating that women receive more demerits than minorities 
it would appear that the perceptions of the Brigade 
regarding women are incorrect.  Their misperceptions may be 
due to their awareness of women being officially reported 
to the Conduct System is higher than their awareness of the 
outcome and punishments awarded.   
     4. THE CONDUCT SYSTEM   
In the context of this study, it is imperative to 
interpret the results within the framework of the 
definition of consistency used: 
Consistency with regard to punishment does not      
always imply that the same offense will receive the 
same punishment every time, but if the punishment 
deviates from expectations, either by seeming 
excessive (harsh) or insufficient (lenient), a 
perception of inequity may occur. 
     In addition, the consistency of punishment is only 
measured by demerits awarded by subgroup to athletes, 
minorities, females, and all four classes. The fact that 11 
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percent of the cases received no demerits has no noteworthy 
effect on the character of the results, as can be seen when 
these cases are excluded from the regression model as 
presented in Appendix G.  The assumption in regards to 
demerits awarded is that if they are inconsistent, other 
forms of punishment are also suspect of the same.  This 
study does not account for the many other possible reasons 
that may contribute to midshipmen having varied perceptions 
of the consistency of punishment.  For example, different 
company-to-company punishments and/or apparent randomness 
of punishments awarded by Adjudicating Authorities may also 
add to perceptions. 
On average from 1998-2001, 38 percent of midshipmen 
felt that “disciplinary action is too inconsistent.”  
Additionally, 6 percent felt “discipline is generally too 
lenient” and 30 percent “too harsh.”  Under the definition 
of consistency used for this study both “lenient” and 
“harsh” would be included as being inconsistent, or other 
than fair.  This now raises the tally of potentially 
inconsistent opinion to a substantial 74 percent. Although 
the regression results do indicate some very small 
inconsistencies, the weight of the results, in both 
significance and actual number of demerits, does not 
strongly support a charge that punishments are particularly 
lenient or harsh, and thereby inequitable.  Therefore, this 
study concludes that the statistical analysis is not 
congruent with the strength of the majority perception of 
inconsistency, at least in so far as the inconsistency 
relates to the subgroups focused on in this study.   
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
     Overall, a midshipman who commits a conduct offense 
can be confident that he or she will be awarded demerits 
consistent, within the definition of this study, and within 
the policies outlined by the Administrative Conduct System 
Manual.  Simply, this means that the demerits received will 
be commensurate with the level of offense.  However, there 
is cause for awareness of possible prejudices revealed in 
the disparate results of this study. There are slightly 
higher demerit awards particularly for minorities and 
women.   
The statistical analysis of this study combined with 
the surveyed perceptions of midshipmen regarding the USNA 
Administrative Conduct System demonstrates a considerable 
degree of faulty perceptions.  It is difficult to affirm or 
negate a person’s perception on any issue because those 
perceptions are derived from experiences, real or not.  The 
statistical analysis aligned with the surveyed perceptions 
is but one tool in providing clarity to the perceptions.  
The results of this study suggest that the perceptions are 
not wholly congruent with the data in the context of 
demerits awarded.  
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V. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
To which cannot be done perfectly must be done in 




      This thesis seeks to objectively examine a subjective 
process.  Circumstances surrounding similar offenses differ 
from case to case, and there is no single number of 
demerits appropriate in apparently similar cases.  Given 
the independence and humanity of Adjudicating Authorities 
and the lack of coordination among them, it would be 
surprising if some inconsistency were not perceived, and 
also found.  To expect perfection, statistical significance 
with zero coefficients, is contrary to any assumption that 
could logically be derived about a subjective process, 
particularly when racial and gender integrations issues are 
included.  The idea of subjectivity alone connotes multiple 
points of view and is synonymous with words like bias, 
prejudice, and partisanship.   
     The definition of consistency stated by this study is 
founded in the idea of equity.  It states that consistency 
with regard to punishment does not always imply that the 
same offense will receive the same punishment every time, 
but if the punishment deviates from expectations, either by 
seeming excessive (harsh) or insufficient (lenient), a 
perception of inequity may occur.  Therefore consistency of 
punishment is fundamental to a rational system and to the 
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perception of equity.  Ideally, the vision for the Conduct 
System should promote equity as its highest measure of 
consistency. 
     The irony behind midshipmen perceptions that tend to 
view the Conduct System as harsh, lenient and inconsistent, 
all less than fair, is the fact that the midshipmen accept 
this state of inequity as part of the price of maintaining 
their limited control of the system.  A supplementary 
question from the Values Survey (1998-2001) relating to 
conduct finds that, on average, 60% are willing to accept 
inconsistency in adjudications.  Though this particular 
question specifically addresses the issues of company-to-
company inconsistencies, the key is that the majority is 
willing to accept inconsistency in order to have 
involvement by the midshipmen chain of command in the 
adjudication of conduct offenses.  It is questionable 
whether midshipmen would be as accepting of disparate 
treatment toward minorities and gender.  It is recommended 
that a question addressing such disparities be asked. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
     The null hypothesis that there is no inconsistency of 
punishment across time or among subgroups is rejected by 
the statistical results of this study.  Results from the 
data analysis in Chapter IV reveal that there are 
numerically small inconsistencies or disparities in how 
demerits are awarded by Adjudicating Authorities, adversely 
affecting minorities and women.  The disparity in regards 
to how demerits are awarded to different classes does not 
appear to be supported by a bias; instead it is likely a 
result of the construct of the four-class system and the 
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norms and values of the Brigade.  The literature and 
studies presented in Chapter 2, particularly on the issues 
of minorities and gender, lead toward an expectation of 
disparate treatment, however slight.   
     The issue of minority and gender integration, though 
to a lesser degree than in American society broadly, 
undeniably still challenges the military culture.  This 
study indeed reflects the notions of Moskos (1973) who 
concludes that the military environments, coupled with 
similar socio-educational backgrounds, are conducive to a 
condition in which inequities and disparities are reduced, 
not eliminated. 
     The following is a summary of this study’s major 
findings: 
· Athletic status, minority status, gender and class 
account for approximately 1% of the explained variance 
in demerits issued in the statistical model.  Level of 
offenses and secondary offenses account for the 
remaining 99% and are the primary criteria by which 
demerits are awarded.  
· Athlete conduct cases are significantly fewer than 
their Brigade representation and the regression 
results were not statistically significant. Therefore, 
this study cannot support a claim that if an athlete 
commits an offense he/she will be given fewer 
demerits, which would reflect the strong perceptions 
of the Brigade that suggests the Conduct System is 
“biased in favor” of athletes. 
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· Minorities are significantly over-represented in 
conduct case relative to their Brigade representation.  
Additionally, the regression results were significant 
with a positive coefficient indicating they received 
on average .964 more demerits than Caucasian.  These 
results are exactly contrary to a strong perception of 
the Brigade that the Conduct System is “biased in 
favor” of minorities.  
 
· Female conduct cases are significantly fewer than 
their Brigade representation.  However, the regression 
results were significant with a positive coefficient 
indicating they received on average 1.351 more 
demerits than males.  This last result is contrary to 
the perception of the Brigade that the Conduct System 
is “biased in favor” of women. 
· Of all four classes, the regression results indicate 
that 3/C midshipmen received 4.917 more demerits than 
1/C midshipmen, who received the least.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
     This study has been conducted in order to provide 
Naval Academy personnel, both officers and midshipmen, with 
an increased awareness in regards to the equity of 
punishment under the Conduct System.  
     Because the demographic variables in this study 
suggest only a small impact in the statistical model, their 
practical significance is limited.  It is the opinion of 
the author of this study that an explicit action or change 
to the Conduct System policy is not warranted by the 
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results of this study alone.  The significance of the 
results does not justify any shift in policy or action that 
may impose limits on individual judgments of leaders within 
the Brigade and Academy staff.  
    Since punishments are awarded by Adjudicating 
Authorities only, they are the focus for recommendations.  
In concert with the recommendations made by Admiral Boorda 
twelve years ago, this study recommends increased awareness 
in considering consistency in the awarding of punishment 
under the Conduct System.   
     To achieve this, first, training of Adjudicating 
Authorities is fundamental. To date there is none. This 
duty is delegated by rank and billet position of both 
officers and midshipmen.  Awareness of disparities 
throughout the Brigade in regards to the Conduct System 
should be continuously monitored and managed by the Conduct 
Officer and Brigade Conduct staff at the Company, 
Battalion, and Regimental levels.  Specifically, it is 
recommended that each Adjudicating Authority be regularly 
advised of his/her punishment awarding record in relation 
to that of other Adjudicators.  Awareness alone may be 
enough force to reduce inconsistencies and reveal concealed 
prejudices.   
     To foster perceptions that are founded on fact vice 
rumor and anecdote, it is recommended that a conduct 
accountability board be formed.   Chaired by the Brigade 
Conduct Officer, and made up from respective Battalion and 
Company conduct staff, this board would monitor conduct 
case results.  It would serve an implicit and explicit 
function.  Implicitly, Adjudicating Authorities, knowing 
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that their cases are going to be reviewed by midshipmen 
will be much more attentive to the outcomes they produce.  
Explicitly, the board can disseminate timely and accurate 
information regarding cases, particularly high profile 
ones, and dispel misconceptions that arise from rumor and 
incomplete information.   
     The overall goal of this accountability board is not 
to be punitive, provocative, or second-guessing of 
Adjudicating Authorities.  Nor is it intended to be the 
conduit for an appeal process.  The intent will be to 
ensure certainty of Conduct System policy and consistency 
of punishment commensurate with the level of offense and 
with due regard for the professional behavior development 
of the offender and the good order and discipline of the 
Brigade.   
D. ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
     The following areas for further research are warranted 
on the basis of the results of this study and to provide 
additional insight into the Naval Academy’s Conduct System:   
 
· An analysis to determine the priority weight given to 
all forms of punishment and to determine if those 
weights change from class to class. 
· An analysis of each form of punishment to validate or 
invalidate the assumption made by this study that, if 
inconsistency exists in one punishment, it is likely 
to exist in others. 
· An analysis to thoroughly explore the four-class 
system and its relation to the Conduct System.  Though 
this study identified which class will receive more 
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demerits, the interpretation as to why remains 
speculative. 
· An analysis that focuses on repeat offenders in an 
effort to further explain the results of this study. 
· An analysis that explores whether or not there is a 
difference in punishment in relation to whether the 
case is reported by a midshipmen or officer. 
· The interpretation of the survey questions of this 
study in relation to the statistical data was not 
performed systematically based on formal survey theory 
and construction.  A thorough analysis of the Values 
Survey questions regarding the Conduct System is 
warranted.  This may include the examination of the 
perceptions of different subgroups toward each other.  
For example, what are the perceptions of minorities 
about the treatment of minorities?   
 
     Such studies will contribute to a climate of real and 
perceived equity and ensure the Naval Academy continues its 
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APPENDIX A.  CORRELATION OF ALL VARIABLES  
Correlations:  ALL VARIABLES 
Correlations
1.000 .008 .016 .037** .174** .804** .435**
. .488 .173 .001 .000 .000 .000
7704 7704 7704 7704 7704 7704 7704
.008 1.000 -.071** .038** -.023* .005 .034**
.488 . .000 .001 .041 .674 .003
7704 7704 7704 7704 7704 7704 7704
.016 -.071** 1.000 .036** .048** -.010 .005
.173 .000 . .001 .000 .376 .669
7704 7704 7704 7704 7704 7704 7704
.037** .038** .036** 1.000 .043** .003 .084**
.001 .001 .001 . .000 .790 .000
7704 7704 7704 7704 7704 7704 7704
.174** -.023* .048** .043** 1.000 .107** .122**
.000 .041 .000 .000 . .000 .000
7704 7704 7704 7704 7704 7704 7704
.804** .005 -.010 .003 .107** 1.000 .411**
.000 .674 .376 .790 .000 . .000
7704 7704 7704 7704 7704 7704 7704
.435** .034** .005 .084** .122** .411** 1.000
.000 .003 .669 .000 .000 .000 .







































Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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APPENDIX B.  REGRESSION OF MINORITY GROUPS 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), Other & Missing, Secondary
Offense, 3/C Midshipmen, African-American, Native
American/Hawaiin & Pacific Islander, Athletic Status,
Asian-American & Filipino, Gender, Hispanic & Puerto














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Other & Missing, Secondary Offense, 3/C Midshipmen,
African-American, Native American/Hawaiin & Pacific Islander, Athletic Status,
Asian-American & Filipino, Gender, Hispanic & Puerto Rican, 4/C Midshipmen, 2/C
Midshipmen, Level of Offense
a. 
Dependent Variable: Number of Demerits Awardedb. 
 
Coefficientsa
8.543 .270 31.696 .000
2.517E-02 .359 .000 .070 .944
1.374 .447 .020 3.071 .002
2.880 .372 .056 7.748 .000
4.931 .424 .083 11.628 .000
4.024 .509 .056 7.901 .000
45.121 .437 .746 103.152 .000
7.759 .477 .118 16.265 .000
1.534 .509 .020 3.015 .003
.251 .535 .003 .470 .638
1.643 .772 .014 2.128 .033
-.145 1.402 -.001 -.103 .918


























Dependent Variable: Number of Demerits Awardeda. 
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APPENDIX C.  REGRESSION WITH GENDER/MINORITY INTEGRATIONS 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), Secondary Offense, Minority
Status, 3/C Midshipmen, Athletic Status, Gender, 4/C
Midshipmen, Female-Minority-Athlete, 2/C














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Secondary Offense, Minority Status, 3/C Midshipmen,
Athletic Status, Gender, 4/C Midshipmen, Female-Minority-Athlete, 2/C Midshipmen,
Level of Offense, Minority-Athlete, Female-Athlete, Female-Minority
a. 
Dependent Variable: Number of Demerits Awardedb. 
 
Coefficientsa
8.593 .276 31.107 .000
-.417 .435 -.008 -.957 .338
1.005 .426 .019 2.356 .018
1.252 .942 .011 1.329 .184
1.414 .640 .021 2.210 .027
1.708 1.122 .014 1.521 .128
-1.265 2.673 -.004 -.473 .636
-1.578 1.107 -.013 -1.426 .154
2.862 .372 .056 7.699 .000
4.916 .424 .083 11.590 .000
4.039 .509 .056 7.928 .000
45.094 .437 .746 103.140 .000

























Dependent Variable: Number of Demerits Awardeda. 
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APPENDIX D.  LEVOFF & SCNDOFF REGRESSIONS 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), Level of Offensea. 
 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Level of Offensea. 
Dependent Variable: Number of Demerits Awardedb. 
 
Coefficientsa
11.622 .172 67.734 .000
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APPENDIX D:  LEVOFF & SCNDOFF REGRESSSIONS (Cont.) 
Regression with Cats I, III, & IV Offenses 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), Secondary Offense, Minority
Status, 3/C Midshipmen, Athletic Status, Gender,
Category 1 Offenses: 00-10 Demerits Maximum, 4/C
Midshipmen, 2/C Midshipmen, Category 4 Offenses:














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Secondary Offense, Minority Status, 3/C Midshipmen,
Athletic Status, Gender, Category 1 Offenses: 00-10 Demerits Maximum, 4/C
Midshipmen, 2/C Midshipmen, Category 4 Offenses: 35-100 Demerits Maximum,
Category 3 Offenses: 20-35 Demerits Maximum
a. 
Dependent Variable: Number of Demerits Awardedb. 
 
Coefficientsa
8.238 .478 17.219 .000
8.052E-02 .387 .001 .208 .835
.794 .381 .015 2.088 .037
1.531 .485 .023 3.160 .002
1.647 .404 .032 4.076 .000
3.195 .462 .054 6.923 .000
-.551 .557 -.008 -.988 .323
-2.474 .547 -.045 -4.524 .000
2.599 .492 .056 5.285 .000
39.388 .577 .702 68.313 .000



























Dependent Variable: Number of Demerits Awardeda. 
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APPENDIX D:  LEVOFF & SCNDOFF REGRESSSIONS (Cont.) 
 
 
Regression with LEVOFF & SCNDOFF 
 
Model Summary






















Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Secondary Offense, Level of Offensea. 
Dependent Variable: Number of Demerits Awardedb. 
 
Coefficientsa
10.981 .172 63.717 .000
45.476 .441 .752 103.161 .000















Dependent Variable: Number of Demerits Awardeda. 
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APPENDIX E:  REGRESSION WITH MINOR CASES ONLY 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), Secondary Offense, Minority














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Secondary Offense, Minority Status, 3/C Midshipmen,
Athletic Status, Gender, 4/C Midshipmen, 2/C Midshipmen
a. 
Dependent Variable: Number of Demerits Awardedb. 
 
Coefficientsa
8.037 .200 40.283 .000
-.505 .275 -.021 -1.836 .066
.626 .270 .027 2.316 .021
2.361 .346 .080 6.831 .000
3.178 .284 .141 11.179 .000
5.802 .330 .219 17.564 .000
7.102 .399 .219 17.815 .000




















Dependent Variable: Number of Demerits Awardeda. 
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APPENDIX F:  INTERPRETATION CROSSTABULATIONS/CHI-SQUARES 
 
Crosstabs/Chi-Squares of IV’s to levoff & scndoff 
 






















































Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
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Appendix F (cont.):  Interpretation Crosstabulations/Chi-Squares 
 























































Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
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Appendix F (cont.):  Interpretation Crosstabulations/Chi-Squares 
 






















































Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
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Appendix F (cont.):  Interpretation Crosstabulations/Chi-Squares 
 























































Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
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Appendix F (cont.):  Interpretation Crosstabulations/Chi-Squares 
 





















































Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
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Appendix F (cont.):  Interpretation Crosstabulations/Chi-Squares 
 






















































Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
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Appendix F (cont.):  Interpretation Crosstabulations/Chi-Squares 
 





















































Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 




  92 
Appendix F (cont.):  Interpretation Crosstabulations/Chi-Squares 
 






















































Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
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Appendix F (cont.):  Interpretation Crosstabulations/Chi-Squares  
 





















































Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
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Appendix F (cont.):  Interpretation Crosstabulations/Chi-Squares 
 






















































Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
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Appendix F (cont.):  Interpretation Crosstabulations/Chi-Squares 
 





















































Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
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Appendix F (cont.):  Interpretation Crosstabulations/Chi-Squares 
 






















































Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 




  97 
Appendix F (cont.):  Interpretation Crosstabulations/Chi-Squares 
 





















































Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
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Appendix F (cont.):  Interpretation Crosstabulations/Chi-Squares 
 






















































Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
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APPENDIX G:  REGRESSION WITH POSITIVE DEMERIT CASES 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), Secondary Offense, Minority
Status, 3/C Midshipmen, Athletic Status, Gender, 4/C













Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Secondary Offense, Minority Status, 3/C Midshipmen,
Athletic Status, Gender, 4/C Midshipmen, Level of Offense, 2/C Midshipmen
a. 
Dependent Variable: Number of Demerits Awardedb. 
 
Coefficientsa
10.761 .270 39.790 .000
-9.35E-02 .349 -.002 -.268 .789
1.055 .343 .020 3.075 .002
1.196 .434 .018 2.756 .006
2.420 .367 .047 6.600 .000
3.667 .411 .062 8.923 .000
2.411 .486 .034 4.960 .000
46.871 .419 .791 111.991 .000





















Dependent Variable: Number of Demerits Awardeda. 
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